An Atrack Against My “OpenDRM.”

To envision a potential attack on OpenDRM, we modify a dictionary attack against the salt. We see dictionary attacks on passwords, and rainbow table projects against hashes. In OpenDRM, we salt the progress from md5 hash to md5 hash by iteration. 

In the algorithm, we specify “object code looking stuff.” This category does not lend itself to any dictionary attack, and while you could possibly rule out large swaths of pronounceable instances, you would still be left with a lot of entries that iterate randomly. 

Part two, securing the extant article against my new attack, is that the LENGTH of the salt is NOT specified, leaving no structure to construct a dictionary against it.

Attack: Hitherto, Red Team has attacked salts by calculating creatively chosen instances, and seeking matches in rainbow tables. My idea is to contrive some idea of a generalized vector pointing from hash0 to hash1. The improvement of this strategy is that creatively modifying the vector might result in a better probability of guessing correctly. To reiterate, the resulting guess would be checked against a rainbow table, not a single hash.

My only suggestion of a specific “creative” tactic might be to copy the efforts of NSA to identify starting vectors for RSA keys from patterns of accumulation in the otherwise random source material. 

Can some generalized vector calculation be used to convert near correct guesses at the result of a salt, into deterministic answers or results?

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