Card Game: Compromise The Missionary

 Compromise The Missionary

To play Compromise The Missionary, hold out all 7’s. Shuffle three 7’s and place them in small draw pile face down. Hold 7 of spades face up.

Deal five cards each. 

Assessing Red suits at positive integers, and Black suits as negative integers, use your cards to contrive the sum of seven as many ways as possible.

Score each successful summation as 5 points on a graph of (potentially) Seven X’s. Represent the first two sums as the crossbars of the “X.” Score successive summations as a dot in a side of the “X.” So each completed X adds up to 30 points (like many domino games.) Cards used in the summation(s) go into a discard pile.

Draw to fill a hand of five cards. If you choose, you can neglect to devise a summation. Discard at least one in the discard pile and draw to fill a hand of five cards.

Whenever a player plays an Ace, he draws from the 7’s pile. If he plays the Ace of Spades, he automatically collects the 7 of Spades.

The hand ends with scoring the successful summations of the player who draws the last 7. Then, assess the points of each player with a red 7 as positive. The player with the 7 of spades gets automatic positive points, but the 7 of clubs converts all gains for that hand to negative points. If a player collects more than one 7, the 7 of clubs is trump, and negates gains.

If the 7 of clubs is the last seven available, players can delay playing an ace, with the penalty that the eventual negative assessment mounts during the delay. It is not against the rules to accumulate aces, but the player holding the 7 of clubs is finally accounted with negative points when players exhaust the draw pile.

Shuffle and re-deal, passing the responsibility counter-clockwise.

Add or subtract the scored points to each player’s total. The game ends with the first player to equal or surpass 420. 

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

A "Secure" OS made PRACTICAL

I can remember suggesting a theoretical Operating System that requires object code to be compiled in such a way that a decryption key is required for a program object to execute. The program object itself would execute unencrypted in RAM.  I cannot find the entry at the moment, but I have also suggested an OS that uses an RSA key for program installation. Separately, I have contemplated a Linux user, organized such that the encrypted home folder appeared as an UNMOUNTED container over IP, while operating as a MOUNTED container locally, for the profile user. This would defeat some purposes of SSH, but would harden the installation against data theft over IP.  Now, with the development of an offline username/password for a program, I am asking myself if I cannot effectively suggest a practical (as opposed to theoretical) arrangement, whereby the program presents a credential (or two - username/password) to the OS, for permission to execute. Clearly, multiple program objects w...
Read more

DRM and Password Authorization

We log in online and are accustomed to being refused service if we supply an incorrect username/password combination.  We persecute "plain-text offenders" and rightly expect to benefit from comparing a hash fingerprint of the credential presented online to a list of hash fingerprints, each paired with a username. Even better if the username is hashed as well. The knowledge gained from online handshakes can benefit us in digital rights management.  It has long been the case that we could obfuscate a password literal in source code by compiling it into object code. However, decompilers provide assembler code that can reconstruct the source code without descriptive variable names and make string values stand out. Now, we can construct a creative solution. We can designate a username/password combination to COMPILE SOURCE UNIQUELY FOR EACH USER. To hide it in the object code, we hash the username and password with a published hash algorithm and use the hash-fingerprint literal in...
Read more

A Simple Open DRM

We love to hate DRM, because we associate it with degraded quality or loss of data control. Sometimes we associate it with loss of privacy when we register.  Here is a formative "Open DRM." The kernel of the system is going to be the idea that a salted hash is a member of a class of some kind. If I start with a MEMBER md5 hash and run 200,000 iterations of the correct salt, I hit a control value predictably.  The potential problem arises not from providing 199,999 different possible keys, but from providing a registered customer with his own valid replacement, on that rare occasion when he proves he has purchased it, and we must re-present his original key. Standing behind the warranty is what makes us reputable. To preserve his privacy AND the security of our system, we do not want to store the enumerated value on the server.  However, we can reasonably suppose that we can manage to keep a secret value secure. I propose that the DBM or LLC choose a passphrase of some kin...
Read more